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The Implications of Systematic Fed Errors for Studies
of Announcement Effects
Abstract
In this paper we show that the errors in the Federal Reserve's weekly preliminary
money supply estimates may be treated as an autoregressive, conditionally
heteroskedastic (ARCH) process. We present theoretical and empirical evidence
concerning the in5)lications of systematic Fed errors for announcement effect studies.
The results show that findings in previous studies of structural change in the
response of interest rates to unanticipated changes in the money supply and of
significant negative effects of anticipated money changes on interest rates are not
robust when corrections are made to incorporate efficient market responses to
error-ridden announcements.
1. Introduction
Numerous articles have been written on the empirical relationship between asset
prices and money supply behavior. One widely studied area of this research has been
the impact of the Federal Reserve Bank's weekly announcements of changes in the money
supply on interest rates,The t3^ical methodology utilized in these studies is to
regress the change in short- or long-terra interest rates (taken over a period begin
ning before and ending after the Fed's announcement) on measures of the market's pre-
announcement expectations of the change in the money supply, and on the difference
between the announced change and the market's expectation of the change. The theory
of efficient markets suggests that only the unanticipated change in the money supply
should have an effect on interest rates.
Although these studies differ in their measures of expected money supply changes,
the time span over which interest rate changes are taken, and the sample periods sel
ected for analysis, the results are quite consistent. An illustration of a tjrpical
empirical specification is;
1978:1-1979:A0 = .047 - .013M^_ + .02CM^ - M^_); = .11
C3.62) C1.51T (2.977 ^
1979:41-1984:2 R^ = .038 - .04M?_ + .074(mJ - ; R^ = .23
(1.80) (2.85) (7.72)
(1)
The sample is divided into two subsamples corresponding to periods before and after
• Fed's announced change in policy in October, 1979. R^ is the change in the 3-month
_ Treasury bill rate taken from the close before the Fed's announcement to the close
after the announcement. . is the Fed's announcement of the change in the money sup-
2/ Pply^, and is the market's pre-announceraent expectation of the Fed's announce-
3/ment.- The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
The results reported in equation (1) are quite representative of the results
generally found from announcement effect studies. The coefficients on anticipated
money changes are negative and the coefficients on unanticipated money changes are
positive. Hie coefficients on anticipated money changes are often significant in the
period after the Fed's October 1979 policy change and are generally not significant at
standard levels before then. However, even in the earlier sample periods, the
estimated coefficients on anticipated money changes are often similar in magnitude to
the coefficients on unanticipated money changes and often have marginal significance
levels approaching the 10 percent level.—^ Finally, there is a substantial increase
in the size of the coefficient on unanticipated money in the second period relative to
the first period.
Clearly, the findings of large and significant price responses to anticipated
money are puzzling to economists who believe strongly that asset markets react quickly
to new information. Recently. Roley (1983); Clark, Joines and Phillips (1985); and
Deaves, Melino and Pesando (1987) have explored the possibility that this anomalous
result is due^^to systematic errors in a commonly used measure of market e:q)ectations,
the Money Market Services, Inc. survey median of market expectations of money supply
changes. Belongia, Hafer and Sheehan (1986) explored the possibility that the anomaly
is due to misspecification caused by instability in the coefficients on unanticipated
money. This paper explores another potential explanation for the puzzle. In particu
lar, we explore the impacts on announcement effect studies when the Fed's weekly
announcements of the money supply are subject to systematic errors. We demonstrate
that such errors can result in biased coefficients in estimates such as those reported
in equation (1). Among other possibilities, these biases can lead to incorrect infer
ence regarding the significance of the coefficient on anticipated money changes and
the instability of the coefficient on unanticipated money changes. We also report
empirical results that are consistent with this theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the
theoretical framework and show some conditions under which announcement effect studies
will yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the responses of asset prices to anti
cipated and unanticipated money supply changes. In Section 3, we implement the theory
in an empirical analysis of the error structure of the Fed's preliminary money supply
announcements. The error structure of the market's estimates of the money supply are
analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5, we report the estimation of interest rate
responses to money supply announcements incorporating our findings in Sections 3 and
4. A brief summary concludes the paper.
2. Interpreting Error-^Ridden Money Supply Estimates
This section illustrates how the structure of the Fed's estimation errors can
affect the interpretation of coefficient estimates in studies of announcement effects.
This discussion can easily be generalized to encompass market responses to other
government announcements. Suppose that on day t, the Fed announces its estimate,
F of the true money supply, Given that the Fed's preliminary estimates contain
errors, there are two ways to interpret conventional models of how asset prices
respond to this announcement. One interpretation is that economic agents are
interested in the announcement because it reveals information about the actual
behavior of the money supply. In this case, we can represent the change in an asset's
price on the day of the announcement, R^, by the reduced-form equation
where ECM^Il^ ^_) is the market's estimate of the money supply based upon its informa
tion set prior to the Fed's announcement, I and ECM.[I ^ .M^) is its estimate of
m,t tm,t t
the money supply following the Fed's announcement. The disturbance process is
assumed to be a white noise process that is orthogonal to these forecasts. The
neutrality h3rpothesis implies that a is equal to zero.
An alternative interpretation of announcement effect studies is that economic
agents are interested in the Fed announcements per se, i.e., regardless of their
implications about the actual behavior of the money supply. In this case we can
represent by the following reduced-form model
R =a'E(M!lI . ) + P'(m! - E(MflI ,.))+£; (2')
t tm,t- "^t tm,t- t
where is a white noise disturbance process and a' will be equal to zero if the
neutrality h3^othesis pertains to (2').
Since (2) is a reduced-form equation, a regression of R on E(M.|I ._) and
t u HI^ ^
FE(M II ) - E(M. |I ) will yield, under general conditions, consistent
L» JO I u u ^ in I u**
estimates of a and p. In practice, the market's estimate of the money supply condit-
ioned on the Fed announcement, E(M.[I ), has been replaced by the Fed announce-
t Hi y w ^
Fment itself, M^. Whether the coefficients obtained from a regression of R^ on
FE(M |I ) and M. - E(M.II . ) will be a consistent estimator of a and B depends on
t m,t- t t m,t- ^
F Fthe relationship between M and E(M |I ) which, in turn, depends on the error
structure of the Fed's preliminary estimates. If the Fed's preliminary estimates
fully account for all of the relevant information available to the market, then
F FE(MtlIm ^t equivalent, and a and p can be estimated consistently. In
that case, the differences between equations (2) and (2') are purely cosmetic. Since
there is reason to suspect that the Fed's preliminary estimates fail to.account for
all relevant information available to the market, however, the equivalence of and
F
^^^t'^m,t-'\^ suspect. If this equivalence fails, then the coefficients from a
p
regression of R on E(M |I ) and M. - E(M [I ) will generally be biased and
U L Cnii'C
inconsistent estimators of a and p in (2).
We can write
which e3q>resses the discrepancy between the Fed's money supply estimate and the
market's pre-announcement estimate into the sum of the Fed's error and the market's
error. It will be assumed that the market observes the noisy signal M - E(M |I )
V ^ jnI
and then uses optimal signal extraction procedures to estimate - E(M^|I ). The
t t m,t-
resulting estimate of M - E(M |I ) is the unanticipated change in the money supply
^ ^ in f u
by the market from the Fed's announcement.
Let u denote the market's pre-announcement forecast error, M - E(M 11 ), and
^ t t m,t-
Flet e^ denote the Fed's forecast error, Since the market is assumed to util
ize its information set efficiently in forming its money supply estimates, its
pre-announcement estimation errors can be characterized by a white-noise process.
2
Let denote the (constant) variance of this process. Initially, it will also be
assumed that the Fed's estimation errors mimic a white-noise process and will
denote its variance. The covariance between u^ and e will be denoted a It
t t ue
follows that the minimum-variance, linear estimator of u^ given - E(M il ) is
t t t m,t-
u^ where
^ue ~ if the Fed's estimation error is uncorrelated with the market's
% . . F
pre-announceraent error, then clearly is less than but proportional to -
F
E(M |I ). Even with a nonzero a , studies of announcement effects which use M. -
t m,t- ue t
ECM ll ) instead of u in regression equations will not be misled in terms of the
u HI11t
sign and significance of p in equation (2) unless is sufficiently negative.—
Now suppose that the Fed's errors are serially correlated. For example, suppose
that e follows an AR(1) process. As before, upon hearing the Fed's preliminary money
F
supply estimate the market faces the problem of trying to decompose
into u and e . However, in this case it will obtain a better estimate of u by
t t ^
adding the Fed's error from the previous week, to its conditioning set.—The
Foptimal linear estimator of conditioned upon ^_) and
the form
1 = rWf - E(M^II . )] + 6e^ , (4)
t t t m.t- t-1
where 6 0. The precise forms of y and 6 will depend upon the joint distribution of
8/
the u(t) and e(t) processes and they can be derived using conventional methods,— It
'V,
is clear, however, that even if u(t) and e(t) are independent processes, u^ will no
F Flonger be strictly proportional to M - E(M |I ). Therefore, when M - E(M |I ._)
u w in I ^ u u m f u
Fis used as a proxy for - E(M^II . ) the coefficient on M. - E(M^|I . ) will not
t t m,t- t t ra,t-
yield direct information on either the sign or the significance of the coefficient p
in (2).
Next suppose that e^ is serially uncorrelated but is conditionally
heteroskedastic, i.e., Var(e^|e^_j^,...) is time dependent. For example, suppose that
9 /e^ evolves according to the ARCH (1) process:—
t -L 2 ^1/2 ,c\
where a^ and a^ are constants and is an independently drawn random variable with
2 2zero mean and unit variance. It follows that Var (e^ Ie^_j^,...) = a^ + ~ °e t
In this case the optimal linear estimator of given - E(M^II . ) and e. , will
t t tm,t- t-i
have the form
- e(m II )].—^ (6)t t t t m,t-
^ FThat is, the relationship between u and M - E(M. |I will not be characterized by
a constant of proportionality but rather by the time dependent parameter This
result follows even if a =0,
ue
Finally, it is possible that the Fed's errors are systematically related to in-
Fformation available to the market at time t other than - E(M^|I ^ ) and past Fed
t t m,t-
errors. For example, suppose that is a k x 1 vector of variables which are observ
able at t and which are related to the Fed's error at t according to
where D is a 1 x k constant vector and E(x v ) = 0. Then even if v is a white noise
Vprocess the market's optimal estimate of u. will not be strictly proportional to M. -
E(M. |I . ). Instead it will have the form
t m,t-
Our theoretical discussion establishes that if market participants use informa
tion efficiently, then the relationship between the "surprise" component of the Fed's
preliminary money supply announcement, M - E(M |I ^_)» and the market's perception
^ ^ in f ^
of the actual money supply innovation upon hearing the announcement, u^, will be char-
actertized by a constant of proportionality only under a special set of circumstances,
Specifically, it requires that the Fed's errors are white noise and are "not too"
negatively correlated with the market's pre-announcement estimation errors. If these
Fcircumstances do not apply, then empirical studies which replace u^ with -
E(M |I ._) cannot yield a"direct interpretation for the sign or the significance of
u JH f w
the parameter p in (2).
The structure of the Fed's estimation errors also has implications for the inter
pretation of the coefficient on anticipated money supply changes in empirical
F ^estimates of (2). It is shown in the Appendix that if - E(M^II ^ ) measures
t t m,t- t
with error, then the estimates of both a and p in (2) will be biased when e^ is
serially correlated or conditionally heteroskedastic. In particular, the estimate of
a, the coefficient on anticipated money, will be biased downward. Since a should
equal zero according to the efficient markets hj^othesis, empirical estimates of a
F ~when M - E(M. ll ) is used instead of u should be negative in the presence of ill-
^ ^ in 9T# L
behaved Fed estimation errors if the market attempts the tj^e of error decomposition
process we proposed above. As we pointed out in the introduction, the estimated
coefficients on anticipated money supply changes have typically been negative in
studies of responses to money supply announcements. Rather than violating the
efficient market condition, such results actually support it provided that the market
attempts to extract and respond to the true component of the Fed's preliminary announ
cement .
3. An Empirical Analysis of Fed Estimation Errors
A general model that allows the Fed's estimation error in week t, "to depend
systematically upon past estimation errors and/or other information available at that
time is the following version of Engle's (1982) ARCH model:
s n 1/2
e. = a^ + 2 a.e. . + Z c.x.. + v.h. (9)
t 0 . 1 1 t-i . , 1 It t t
1=1 1=1
where the are exogenous variables whose values are observable at t and which are
P 2helpful in estimating the money supply; h^ = b^ + ^ zero mean,
unit variance, serially uncorrelated random variable which is uncorrelated with the
x^^'s and past drawings of e^. Under these assumptions.
and
^nfVl = ^0 ^ ? ,Vt-i + ?
1=1 1=1
Var ^nt'Vl'*' *'®1^ " \ ^0 ? .^i®t-i:
1=1
The null hypothesis that the Fed's preliminary money supply estimates are efficient
can be expressed as the hypothesis that in (9), a^=0, i=0,.,.,s; b^=0, i=l,.,.,p; and
c^=0,i=l,...,n.
Using the equality E(y^) =E(ECy |^z^), it is clear that v^h^^^ is uncorrelated
with *'*'^ nt*®t-l''*'*®1 ^ regression of e^ on the x's and lagged e's will
10
be a consistent estimator of the a's and c's. Furthermore, under the null hjrpothesis
the usual t- and F-tests may be derived from this regression to test the restrictions
on the a's and c's. The regression and test results are reported in Table The
p
x-vector used in this analysis included: M - the Fed's money supply announcement at
time t; WEEKl^- a dtimmy variable which equals one if the announcement corresponds to a
week containing the third day of the month; and SSW^- a dummy variable which takes the
value of one if the announcement corresponds to a so-called "Social Security Week".
Social Security Weeks occur if the third day of the month falls on a weekend or on a
Monday or Friday holiday. Hafer (1984) and Clark, Joines and Phillips (1985) have
demonstrated that the first week in the month, and these social security weeks in
particular, correspond to persistent exogenous shocks to the money supply. If Fed
money announcements are rational, then the Fed announcement and these exogenous varia
bles should be uncorrelated with the errors in the Fed's announcement.
Although different lag lengths were tested, the results were consistent across
specifications. Therefore, only the third-order specifications are presented here.
The sample was divided into two parts, corresponding to the two presumably distinct
Fed policy regimes. Consistent with the Mankiw, et_al,- results for quarterly data,
the results strongly reject the hjrpothesis that Fed weekly announcement errors are
white noise. In the first subsample, the Fed's errors are correlated with the Fed's
preliminary announcement, and the dummy variable for social security weeks. The
Fed's errors appear to be serially independent, conditional upon the x-vector, in the
first subsample. In the second subsample, the Fed's errors are~correlated with the
preliminary estimate and they exhibit serially correlation whether the x-vector is or
is not included among the regressors.
While the rejection of the hjrpothesis that the parameters in (9) are jointly
equal to zero is sufficient to reject the white noise hypothesis, we also allowed for
11
the possibility that the variance of the error process in week t depended systematic
ally on past errors and/or ^nt' equation (9) we allowed for the
possibility that one or more elements of the vector was nonzero. Follow
ing Engle (1982, pp. 999-1000) we can test the null hypothesis that the revisions are
homoskedastic, both conditionally and unconditionally, by using a Lagrange multiplier
1/2test. Let w^ denote the disturbance in equation (9), i.e., w^ = v^h^ . Next,
"2 -2 ~2 -2 ~consider the regression of w. on a constant and w^ •, ,w^ , where w^ is the
t t-1 t-2 t-p t
residual from the regressions in Table II. With T being the sample size, the
2 . -2statistic T*R obtained from the p-th order autoregression of w will be distributed
as a Chi-square with p degrees of freedom. We summarize the results in Table III.
The intercept term in these regressions is an estimate of the unconditional
variance of the Fed's preliminary money supply announcement. We find that the
variance rose to 1.19 in the second subsample relative to 0.18 in the first. More
importantly for our present interests, the null hypothesis of conditionally
homoskedastic errors in the Fed's preliminary money supply estimates is soundly
rejected in both samples. These results were robust to changes in the lag
specification.
The evidence which we have presented in this section makes a strong case in favor
of the argument that the estimation errors in the Fed's preliminary money supply an
nouncements have been serially correlated in mean and/or variance. If market agents
are interested in the Fed's preliminary money supply announcements primarily because
of the information they convey about the actual money supply, then this evidence in
validates the common practice of equating the Fed's preliminary money supply estimate
with the market's own post-announcement estimate. In other words, if (2) is the
relevant model, then a regression of R on E(M.II ^ ) and wf-ECM,|I ^ ) will yield
t tm,t- t tm,t-
inconsistent estimates of a and p.
12
4. The Efficiency of Market Money Supply Estimates
Our critique of conventional empirical studies of money supply announcement
effects has relied upon the assumption that market participants use their available
information sets efficiently to estimate the actual money supply. Typically, these
studies use the median value of the Money Market Services, Inc. survejr to measure the
market's pre-announcement estimate of the actual money supply or the Fed's perception
12/of the money supply.— Therefore, it is interesting to explore whether these market
surveys are also subject to systematic errors.
Suppose that the market does use information efficiently and that the Money
Market Services, Inc. estimates are estimates of the actual money supply behavior.
Let M denote the actual weekly change in the money supply and let E(M |I ) denote
t ^ HI^ ^
the market's pre-announcement estimate of as given by the median value of the Money
Market Services, Ihc.'s weekly survey. Then the market's estimation errors, M. -
ECM^II^ t-^' should have a zero mean and constant variance both unconditionally and
conditional upon information available to the market prior to the Fed's announcement.
This hypothesis may be tested using the same ARCH model structure as that used to
analyze the Fed errors in the previous section, specifically:
s n 1/2
M. - E(M. II . ) = a. + 2 ajM. E(M^ .|I ^ . )] + 2 c.x.^ + v^h^ (12)
t t m,t- 0 1 t-i t-i m,t-i- 1 It t t
where v^ is a zero mean, unit variance and serially uncorrelated random variable which
is uncorrelated with past estimation errors and the vector of exogenous variables
. PX. ,...,x . The random variable h. is defined according to h = b« + 5! b.TM . -
t ® t 0 . , 1 t~i
1=1
2
• Th® null hypothesis that the market's estimation errors evolve
according to a white noise process is equivalent to the hypothesis that in (12), a^=
13
0,i=0,...,s;b^=0,i=l,...,p; and c^=0,i=l,...,n.
Alternatively, it is possible that the Money Market Services, Inc. estimates rep
resent the market's forecasts of the Fed's preliminary money supply announcements
(which, we have argued previously, are inefficient estimates of the true money
F
supply). In this case, if the market uses its information set efficiently, -
F F
E(M^|I ^ ) should mimic a white noise process where M. is the Fed's preliminary
t m,t- t
estimate of and E(M^lI ^ ) denotes the median value of the Money Market Services,
t t m,t-
F FInc. weekly survey. As before, we assume that M -E(M |I ) can be represented by
^ u m f u
the ARCH model:
F F ® F F ^M^ - ECM^II . ) = a. + 2 aAK . - E(M^ . ll . . )] + Z c.x.. + v.h. (13)
t t m,t- 0 1 t-i t-i m,t-i- 1 it t t
P F
where the coefficients and variables are defined as before, and h^ = bQ +
F 2 FE(M. .|I . . )]. Under the null hypothesis that E(M^|I ^ ) is an efficient
t-i m,t-i- t in,t-
F
estimator of M., a^ = a,=...=a =0;b,=...=b =0; and c,=...=c =0.
t'Ol s*l p' 1 n
The tests of the two null h5^otheses are reported in Table IV. The null h3^othe-
sis that the Money Market Services, Inc. median survey responses represent efficient
estimates of the true money supply is strongly rejected. However, the tests also lead
us to reject the null hjrpothesis that the survey responses represent efficient
estimates of the Fed's preliminary money supply estimates. In particular, for each
subsample, the differences between the Fed's final money supply announcement and the
survey median are serially correlated, correlated with the survey median itself, cor
related with the social security week dummy, and conditionally heteroskedastic. When
treated as a forecast of the preliminary Fed announcement, the forecast errors are
14
shown to be conditionally homoskedastic but serially correlated in the second
subsample, correlated with the survey median in the second subsample, and correlated
with the social security week dummy in both subsamples.
Thus, we conclude that the median of the Money Market Services, Inc. weekly
survey cannot be taken as a proxy for rational market forecasts of either the initial
or the final Fed money supply announcement. It follows that tests of asset price
t-
responses to anticipated and unanticipated money supply changes will be incorrect if
they use the Money Market Services, Inc. median response as a measure of market fore
casts.—^
5. Estimation of Interest Rate Responses to Money Supply Announcements
We can now return to our original objective: to illustrate the impact of syste
matic Fed errors on the estimation of asset price responses to money supply
announcements. To do this, we estimate equations (2) and (2'), using the information
in Section 4. to guide our choice of proxies for rational market forecasts.
First, we take as our working hypothesis that equation (2') is the true model,
implying that the market's response to the Fed's preliminary announcement is based on
new information about the announced money supply and not the true money supply. For
this case, we measure the market's forecast of the Fed announcement, E(M.II ), as
w jn f w
the fitted value from the regressions reported under Hypothesis I in Appendix B. The
results we obtain from estimating equation (2') are given in Table V. They are con
sistent with those reported in equation (1) except that the negative coefficients on
the anticipated component of the announcement are now much smaller in magnitude and
significance. The null h3^othesis that the coefficients on the unanticipated compon
ent of the announcement are equal across the two subsamples is rejected at the
five-percent significance level.—''
15
The second set of estimates reported in Table Vcorrespond to estimates of
equation (2) which is valid when interest rate movements following the Fed's weekly
money supply announcements represent responses to information about the true money
supply. Prior to estimating equation C2) we require measures of E(M |I ) the
t ID f tmarket's pre-announcement estimate of and , the market's post-
announcement estimate of These measures were obtained as the fitted values of the
regressions reported under Hypothesis II in Appendix B. Ihe estimates of equation (2)
are given in Table V. The results are quite different from those obtained under the
hypothesis that the market responds only to what it perceives the Fed to believe about
the money supply. The coefficients on anticipated money are still insignificant but
now are positive in both subsamples.1^/ Ihe coefficients on unanticipated money are
now substantially larger in magnitude, increasing by a factor of seven in the first
subsample and by a factor of two in the second subsample. Ihe null hypothesis of no
structural change in the response of interest rates to unanticipated money supply
changes is no longer rejected at standard levels.^erefore. the finding of sig
nificant changes in interest rate responses to monetary shocks is not robust to
changes in the assumptions made concerning whether the market is responding to new
information on the Fed's preliminary money supply announcement or to new information
on the true money supply.
The hypotheses: that the response of Interest rates to the Fed's money supply
announcement represents new information about the actual money supply; and that the
. response represents new information about the Fed's estimate of the money supply are
both supported by the regressions reported in Table V. Because these hypotheses are
not nested, we cannot use classical procedures to distinguish between the two. How
ever. further evaluation of the relative validity of the two hypotheses is possible
usxng the nonnested test procedures introduced by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).
16
Consider the nonlinear model
= (l-aHa'E(M!lI . >+ P'[M^ - ECM^II^ >1 +T') + aR +u; (14)
t t m,t-) t t m,t- t t
where is the the fitted value of from our estimated equation (2) in Table V; u^
is an unobservable white-noise disturbance process; and a, a', P', and Y' are unknown
parameters. The hypothesis that the interest rate evolves according to (2) is
rejected in favor of (2*) if the parameter a in (14) is equal to zero. Similarly,
model (2') is rejected in favor of model (2) if the parameter b in the following model
is equal to zero:
R. = (l-b){aE(M. II ^ ) + P[E(M^1I ^ ,m!) - ECM^II . )] + r) +bR. ' +u. (15)
t t m,t- t m,t- t t m,t- t t
where R '^ is the fitted value of R^ from the estimated equation C2') reported in Table
V; u^ is an unobservable white-noise disturbance; and b, a, p, and y are unknown
constants,
We estimated the parameters in (14) and (15) by least-squares methods and then
applied t-tests to determine the significance of a and b. The results indicate that
neither hj^pothesis can be rejected in favor of the other. Specifically, the estimates
of a and b are significantly different from zero at the five-percent level in each
subsample,—^
These results imply that interest rate responses to Fed preliminary money supply
announcements cannot be satisfactorily explained by either h3^othesis alone. Instead,
the market appears to respond both to new information regarding the Fed's current per
ception of the money supply and to new information regarding the true money supply.
The results in Table V show that the distinction between a market attempting to fore-
17
cast an announced estimate of a random variable and a market attempting to forecast
the realization of the random variable can indeed mislead the econometrician regarding
the sign and significance of market responses to money supply announcements. At min
imum, these results indicate that caution must be exercised in deriving conclusions
from announcement effect studies.
6. Summary
This paper has been concerned with the methodology used in "announcement effect
studies" to test money neutrality propositions. It has been a standard practice to
measure the relevant new information conveyed by these announcements as the difference
between the Fed's preliminary money supply estimate and some measure of the market's
pre-announcement estimate. We showed that the Fed's preliminary money supply esti
mates have been systematically wrong so that the standard approach is appropriate only
if: (1) the market's response to the Fed's preliminary estimate is a response to the
Fed estimate per se. rather than being a response to the information being conveyed
about the actual money supply and (2) the empirical measure of the market's pre-an-
nouncement estimate is a measure of the market's forecast of the Fed's preliminary
money supply estimate (rather than being a measure of the market's estimate of the
actual money supply). We also analyzed the time series properties of the most common
ly used measure of the market's pre-announcement estimate, the median value of Money
Market Services, Inc.'s weekly survey, in order to check whether condition (2) can be
maintained in studies that use this measure. We found that the survey median deviates
systematically from both the Fed's preliminary and final estimates of the money sup
ply. We then proceeded to derive better conditional estimators of the Fed's prelimi
nary and final money supply estimates in order to evaluate the applicability of condi
tion (1). We found that, if condition (1) is taken as a maintained h3^othesis, then
the coefficient on anticipated money remains negative but is no longer significant
18
and that strong evidence is obtained for structural change in the response to unanti
cipated changes in the money supply around October 1979. However, if condition (1) is
violated so that the market attempts to extract and respond to information on true
money supply behavior conditional on the Fed's preliminary announcement, then the co
efficient on anticipated money becomes positive and insignificant and we no longer
reject the hj^othesis of no structural change in the response to unanticipated money
changes.
The main conclusion to be derived from this analysis is that it is extremely dif
ficult to derive structural interpretations of the coefficients in announcement effect
studies without knowledge of the error structure of the preliminary announcement, and
without knowledge of whether the market is interested in the announcement itself or in
the final realization of the announced random variable. One market where such knowl
edge may be available is in federal crop forecasts where the market may be safely as
sumed to be interested in the true harvest size and not the government's preliminary
perception of the harvest size. However, no such consensus exists on the nature of
the market's interest in the Fed's money announcements. Indeed, our results suggest
that the market is interested in both Fed preliminary perceptions and the final real
ized value of the change in the money supply.
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Table I
Summary of Notation
: The preliminary announcement of the money stock made by the Federal
Reserve at time t.
: The true value of, the money stock corresponding to the Fed announcement
at t.
Ijjj : The market's information set leading up to the Fed's announcement at t.
u : M - E(M |I ) = market's preannouncement forecast error of the true
t • t. t ,m,t-
value of the money supply.
e^ : = The Fed's forecast error in its preliminary announcement at
time t,
aj : The market's preannouncement error variance
o
Og : The Fed's error variance
a . : The covariance between the Fed's errors and the market's preannouncement
errors.
j A vector of exogenous variables whose values are known at the time of
the Fed's announcement at t.
p
: The median of the Money Market Services, Inc. survey of expectations
concerning the Fed's announcement at t.
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Table III
Tests of the Conditional Homoskedasticity of Fed Revisions
Constant ^t-2
First Subsaii5)le .177 .AA2 -.227 .17 14.3
1978:1 - 1979:40 (2.91) (4.05) (2.08)
Second Subsample
1978:41 - 1984:2 1.19 .264 -.039 .066 14.4
(5.80) (3.88) (.57)
t-statistics in parentheses. Under the null hj^othesis of conditional
homoskedasticity, TR is distributed chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom. The
critical value at the 5 percent level of significance is 5.99. The dependent
variable, wf, is the square of the error from the regresssions reported in Table
II which include SSW^, WEEKl^, and
T
a
b
le
I
V
A
n
al
y
si
s
o
f
th
e
E
rr
o
r
S
tr
u
c
tu
re
o
f
th
e
M
on
ey
M
ar
ke
t
S
er
v
ic
es
,
In
c
.
F
o
re
c
a
st
E
rr
o
rs
R
e
la
ti
v
e
to
th
e
F
ed
's
P
re
li
m
in
a
ry
an
d
F
in
a
l
A
n
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
ts
.
F
ir
s
t
S
u
b
sa
n
^^
le
1
9
7
8
:1
-
1
9
7
9
:4
0
S
ec
o
n
d
S
u
b
sa
m
p
le
1
9
7
9
:4
1
-
1
9
8
4
:2
F
ir
s
t
S
ub
sa
m
pl
e.
1
9
7
8
:1
-
1
9
7
9
:4
0
S
ec
o
n
d
S
u
b
sa
m
p
le
1
9
7
9
:4
1
-
1
9
8
4
:2
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
.4
4
5
(5
.6
4
)
.3
37
*
(2
.4
5
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
D
ep
en
de
nt
v
ar
ia
b
le
=.
=
M
^
-
m
t
-
1
.0
4
(.
8
3
)
-
.0
2
8
(.
4
6
)
®
t-
l
^
-
2
-
.0
2
7
(.
5
6
)
.1
20
*
(1
.9
6
)
m
'
t
-
2
m
t
-
3
.1
1
5
(2
.3
0
)
.0
6
5
(1
.0
7
)
S
S
W
.
1
.0
9
•
(4
.4
4
)
1.
58
*
(2
.9
)
D
ep
en
de
nt
v
ar
ia
b
le
=
m
^
=
"^
t-
3
S
S
W
4
S
S
W
t
-
1
W
E
E
K
l,
-
.1
2
7
.1
3
5
(.
6
1
)
(.
8
4
)
-
.2
6
(.
5
8
)
.2
5
6
(.
7
6
)
4
-
-
.8
9
6
(1
7
.7
)
-.
73
6*
(7
.1
2
)
S
S
W
t
-
1
W
EE
K
l^
R
'
T
R
'
8
2
1
4
.9
'
.2
3
8
.5
'
r2
^j
^2
-.
5
5
3
"
.0
8
5
-
.0
0
8
.1
2
4
1.
69
*
-
.6
3
.5
8
-
.0
3
.1
9
.8
8
(2
.5
6
)
(.
6
4
)
(.
0
8
)
(1
.1
8
)
(2
.4
0
)
(.
9
2
)
(1
.2
4
)
(.
1
9
)
-
.1
1
6
-
.0
4
4
.
1.
51
*
.0
4
9
2.
81
*
-
.3
4
1.
16
*
-.
33
9*
.1
9
.7
3
(.
7
1
)
(.
6
3
)
(2
.3
6
)
(.
7
8
)
(4
.4
4
)
(.
6
2
)
(2
.9
6
)
(2
.7
3
)
t-
s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
s
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
se
t
o
f
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
is
th
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
M
on
ey
M
ar
ke
t
S
er
v
ie
s,
In
c.
m
ed
ia
n
fo
re
ca
st
o
f
th
e
m
on
ey
su
pp
ly
ch
an
ge
an
d
th
e
F
ed
's
an
d
th
e
fi
n
al
re
v
is
ed
m
on
ey
su
pp
ly
es
ti
m
at
e.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
in
th
e
se
co
nd
se
t
o
f
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
is
th
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
M
on
ey
M
ar
ke
t
S
er
v
ic
es
,
In
c.
m
ed
ia
n
fo
re
ca
st
of
th
e
m
on
ey
su
pp
ly
ch
an
ge
an
d
th
e
F
ed
's
p
re
li
m
in
ar
y
an
no
un
ce
d
m
on
ey
su
p
p
ly
ch
an
g
e.
TR
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
AR
CH
te
s
t
o
f
h
e
te
ro
sk
e
d
a
st
ic
e
rr
o
rs
w
it
h
a
c
ri
ti
c
a
l
v
al
u
e
o
f
5.
99
a
t
th
e
.0
5
le
v
el
o
f
si
g
n
if
ic
an
ce
.
(*
)
in
d
ic
at
es
si
g
n
if
ic
an
ce
a
t
th
e
.0
5
le
v
el
.
/
t
o
23
Table V
The Response of Interest Rates to Perceived Weekly Monetary Shocks
Hypothesis; Equation (2') is the correct model, implying that the market
is interested in the Fed's preliminary announcement per se.
a' B' Constant R^
First Subsample -.006 .023* ' .032 .10
1978:1 - 1979:40 (.74) (3.05) (2.89)
Second Subsample
1979:41 - 1984:2 -.003 .075" .047" .18
(.26) (6.88) (2.16)
*
Hypothesis: Equation (2) is the correct model, implying that the market
attempts to extract information on the true money change, conditional on the
Fed's announcement and other available information.
.2
F'
a B Constant R'
First Subsample .016 .165* .022 .10
1978:1 - 1979:40 ,(.49) (3.04) (1.07)
Second Subsample
1979:41 - 1984:2 .021 .146 .032 .18
(.93) (6.89) (1.28)
t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is the change in the 90
day T-bill rate from the close before the Fed's weekly money announcement to the
close after the Fed's weekly money announcement. (*) indicates significance at
the .05 level.
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Notes
These include Bolongia, Hafer and Sheehan (1986); Clark, Joines and Phillips
(1985); Cornell (1983, 1985); Deaves, Melinoand Pesando (1987); Falk and Crazem
(1985); Roley and Walsh (1984); Urich (1982); and Urich and Wachtel (1981),
2/
—The weekly announcements of changes in the narrowly defined money stock are
reported in the Federal Reserve's H.6 releases. The announcement on day t refers to
the change in the money stock over a one-week period ending on the Wednesday of the
previous calendar week, Urich and Wachtel (1981) and Roley have good summaries of
these data,
3/ P— In the regressions reported in equation (1), we projqr by the commonly used
median of the Money Market Services, Inc. survey of market predictions of the change
in the money supply to be announced on day t. Researchers have also used ARIMA models
(Urich and Wachtel) and the fitted values of regressions of Fed announcements on the
Money Market Services, Inc. median and other information available to the market
(Belongia et_al, Clark et al, Deaves et al. and Roley).
4/—For example, over the sample period following the Fed's October 10, 1979 policy
announcement, Roley, Falk and Orazem, Deaves et al. and Urich and Wachtel find a
significant relationship between anticipated money supply changes and asset price
changes. Cornell (1985) does not, although the coefficient has a marginal
significance level of about .135. Urich and Wachtel (1981) find a significant
relationship between these measures prior to October 10, 1979, but most studies using
the Money Market Services, Inc. data show marginal significance levels between .2 and
.1. Marginal significance levels drop in both'periods when other information is added
to the survey median, but coefficients significant at the .1 level are still often
25
obtained in the period after October 10, 1979 (see Clark et al, Deaves et al, and
Roley).
—^Mankiw et al in^licitly assume to equal zero.
^ur examination of the data indicates that, over the sample period 1978:1 -
1984:2, the sample value of was negative but sufficiently close to zero so that
the Mankiw et al conclusion is not reversed when o 0 is allowed.
ue
—''in reality, is not observed directly by the market (or the Fed) until some
time after week t, if ever. Therefore, e^_j^ cannot be in the information set that
market agents use in responding to the Fed's announcement in week t. The market's
signal extraction problem in the case of serially correlated Fed errors would be more
correctly viewed as one in which the market tries to decompose ^_) into
u and e conditional upon that difference and new information received during week t
that can be used to draw inferences about ®t-l'®t-2'* *' example, at the time that
the Fed announces its initial estimate of it also announces revisions to its
previous weeks' estimates. This complication only serves'to .strengthen the main point
of this section.
8/- The problem can be stated formally as finding the projection of M - E(M |I )
HIy
F
on M. ~ E(M. |I . ) and e^ , given the first and second moments of the joint
t t m,t- t-1
distribution of that three-dimensional random vector. See Sargent(1979, Chapter X)
for a discussion of the solution to this type of problem.
9/- The p-th order autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model was
introduced by Engle (1982) as a tractable way to deal with the possibility of a
, nonconstant one-period ahead forecast variance.
—^This conclusion follows directly from the deduction of equation (3) noting
2-
that, under the ARCH assumption, will be time dependent. Notice that the existence
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of serial correlation and/or conditional heteroskedasticity in Fed errors could cause
the frequently reported instability of estimated coefficients on unanticipated money
changes over different sample periods, even if the true structural response of
interest rates to monetary shocks is unchanged.
—^Our measure of the true weekly change in the money supply is the final revised
figure available for the relevant weekly change in the money stock. These data are
taken from the Banking Section of the Division of Research Statistics from 1978
through the end of 1982. Starting in 1983, the Fed stopped reporting revised figures
for weeks ending on Wednesday, and instead reported money stock figures for weeks
ending on Monday. Any attempt to adjust this data to week-ending-iri-Wednesday numbers
would risk creating systematic errors. Therefore, starting in 1983, we used the final
reported week-ending-on-Wednesday figures from the Fed's H.6 release as our measure of
the true money supply.
2/
—Other studies of the rationality of the Money Market Services, Inc. data
include Grossman, Hafer, Urich and Wachtel (1984) and Deaves et al.
13/— Deaves et al show that in principle, using a biased measure of anticipated
money can generate downward bias in the coefficient on anticipated money. However,
their empirical work indicates that at most, the bias in the Money Market Services,
Inc. median forecasts can only explain part of the puzzle. Furthermore, our analysis
shows that the incorporation of serial correlation in market errors complicates the
derivation of the direction of bias. The problem becomes even more complex once the
problem of systematic Fed errors is added to the model and quickly degenerates to one
. where no unambiguous direction of bias can be established.
IV— The F-statistic was 5.39, whereas the critical value at the .05 level was
3.88.
'^ The F-statistic was ,018 with a marginal significance level of .89.
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—''some authors have closed the second sample at October 1982 when the Federal
Reserve switched its operating instrument from the federal funds rate to borrowed
reserves. This period has proven most troublesome in terras of finding significant
coefficients on anticipated money. When we truncate the second sample at week 39 in
1982, our results are:
Sample 1979:41 - 1982:39
(2') a' = -.006;P* = .096*; constant = .067; = ,19
(.35) (6.14) (2.22)
(2) a = .034;P = .184*; constant = .044; = .20
(1,01) (6.08) (1.27)
The null hj^othesis of no change in the response to unanticipated changes in the money
supply is still strongly rejected using equation (2*) and not rejected (marginal
significance level of .91) using equation (2).
^The t-statistics corresponding to the estimate of a in equation (14) were 3.4
in the first sample and 3.3 in the second sample. The t-statistics corresponding to
the estimates of b in equation (15) were 2,0 in the first sample and 2.1 in the second
sample.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we formalize the argument that using the difference
between the Fed's preliminary money supply estimate and the market's
preannouncement estimate as a measure of the unanticipated change in the money
supply will bias conventional tests of money neutrality against that hj^othesis
when the Fed's estimation errors are serially correlated and/or conditionally
heteroskedastic.
FDefine and as in the text. For notational simplicity, define the
market's preannouncement expectation of the true money stock as = E(M II )
t~ t ra,t-
We can decompose the difference between the Fed's preliminary announcement and
the market'is preannouncement expectations, as
t t"
= + \ (A.l)
where u^, defined by equation (3), is the market's optimal estimate of the
unanticipated change in the money supply conditional on the Fed's preliminary
announcement and \j^ is the measurement error resulting from using
rather than u^ as the measure of unanticipated money. We assume that u and \)
are uncorrelated. Combining (A.l). our definition of and equation (2) in
the text, we obtain
where =^t " ^^t* cov^l - =E(\)^), it is clear that a
regression of on and will generate an inconsistent estimate of
p. Under our previous assumption that ECM^_,e^) =0, and if ECM^_u^ =0, then
29
it is straightforward to show that
plim (a - a) « - p covCM^_,M^ - M^_) (A.3)
where a is the regression coefficient on M^_ in (A.2)
To interpret (A.3) first notice, from (A.l), that since
covCM^ = 0 if and only if and are uncorrelated. According to
U" t U U L
(A.l), M^can be interpreted as the market's post-announcement estimate of the
Fed's estimation error. That is, can be viewed as the market's e2q)ectation
of the Fed's subsequent revision given the market's current information set.- If
the Fed's revisions follow a white noise process, then and \)^ will be
uncorrelated. On the other hand, if the Fed's revisions are serially correlated
and/or conditionally heteroskedastic, then and \)^ will be correlated.
E F EConsequently, regressions of on and will generate a consistent
estimate of a only if the Fed's revisions are serially uncorrelated and
conditionally homoskedastic.
Since, as we argued in the text, the Fed's revisions appears to have been
Fserially correlated and conditionally heteroskedastic, regressions of R^ on
F Eand - M^_i would not be expected to generate a value of a equal to zero even
if the neutrality hjrpothesis is correct. According to (A.3), the direction of
E F Ethe bias in this case would depend upon whether p and cov(M^_,
g
like or opposite signs. The sample correlation statistic pertaining to and
F E
was small but positive. Estimates of p in our study are also
positive.
It would follow that the sign of plim (a - a) would be negative. This
could explain the common finding of a < 0 (and often significantly less than
zero) even though the true value of a may be equal to zero.
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